#petya #petrWrap #notPetya

Win32/Diskcoder.Petya.C

Ransomware attack.

About

This gist was built by the community of the researchers and was scribed by Kir and Igor from the QIWI/Vulners.
We are grateful for the help of all those who sent us the data, links and information.
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Got new info? Email at isox@vulners.com or @isox_xx
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Recent news, blog posts and mentions

Research list

Helpful vaccine (not killswitch!)

Looks like if you block C:\Windows\perfc.dat from writing/executing - stops #Petya. Is used for rundll32 import.
https://twitter.com/HackingDave/status/879779361364357121

Local kill switch - create file "C:\Windows\perfc"
It kills WMI vector. Still need to patch MS17-010 for full protection.

Credits:

Group Policy Preferences to deploy the NotPetya vaccine

https://eddwatton.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/use-group-policy-preferences-to-deploy-the-notpetya-vaccine/

SCCM vaccine

https://sccm-zone.com/securing-against-goldeneye-petya-notpetya-petwrap-with-sccm-7e4516da8a81

Ransom

Infected with #Petya? DON’T PAY RANSOM, You wouldn’t get your files back. Email used by criminals has been Suspended.

https://posteo.de/blog/info-zur-ransomware-petrwrappetya-betroffenes-postfach-bereits-seit-mittag-gesperrt

Bitcoin wallet monitoring

https://blockchain.info/address/1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX

Samples:

Archive password: virus

Thanks to the https://twitter.com/OxFemale for the initial malware body.

Source code:

Archive password: virus

Thanks to the @Sn0wFX_:

Initial vector:

Ransomware includes:

Modified EternalBlue exploit
A vulnerability in a third-party Ukrainian software product
A second SMB network exploit

Origin (NO PROOF):

Petya was known to be RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service), selling on Tor hidden services. Looks like WannaCry copycat. Attribution will be hard.
https://twitter.com/x0rz/status/879733138792099842

AvP Bypass

Confirmed AvP bypasing trick is being used by Petya ransomware to evade 6 popular anti-virus signatures (script)
https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/880012620698451968

https://github.com/HackerFantastic/Public/blob/master/tools/bypassavp.sh

Vulnerabilities/Vectors/Actions:

MS17-010

PSEXEC: %PROGRAMDATA%\dllhost.dat is dropped and is legit PSEXEC bin

Remote WMI, “process call create \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \\\"C:\\Windows\\perfc.dat\\\" #1”

Log clean, «wevtutil cl Setup & wevtutil cl System & wevtutil cl Security & wevtutil cl Application & fsutil usn deletejournal /D %c:»

Creates a scheduled task that reboots 1 hour after infection. If task removed before the hour, does not reschedule and can buy time

Petya also attempts to kill Exchange & MySQL if they are running.  If you host either of these services and notice them die, this is including in it's infection process (svchost.exe) // by Mike "Bones" Flowers:

Exec: C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe
Params: /c taskkill.exe /f /im Microsoft.Exchange.*
Exec: C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe
Params: /c taskkill.exe /f /im MSExchange*
Exec: C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe
Params: /c taskkill.exe /f /im sqlserver.exe
Exec: C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe
Params: /c taskkill.exe /f /im sqlwriter.exe
Exec: C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe
Params: /c taskkill.exe /f /im mysqld.exe

The new ransomware can also spread using an exploit for the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability CVE-2017-0144 (also known as EternalBlue), which was fixed in security update MS17-010 and was also exploited by WannaCrypt to spread to out-of-date machines. In addition, this ransomware also uses a second exploit for CVE-2017-0145 (also known as EternalRomance, and fixed by the same bulletin)

Machines that are patched against these exploits (with security update MS17-010 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx) or have disabled SMBv1 (https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2696547) are not affected by this particular spreading mechanism

Test local account behavior [NOT TESTED]:

Don’t know if you have also noticed, but it only encrypted the MFT records for my test user account profile folders, the default Windows accounts Administrator, default user etc were all untouched, my test account was local so I don’t know what behaviour would be expected for domain account profile folders.

100% on the sample used by me and on a standalone computer, user files were encrypted prior to reboot and the malware was not able to escalate privileges to deploy the MFT encryption payload, no instructions were deposited about recovering these files

http://imgur.com/a/FhaZx

Possible IP addresses:

185.165.29.78
84.200.16.242
111.90.139.247
95.141.115.108

Email:

wowsmith123456@posteo.net
iva76y3pr@outlook.com         // by WhiteWolfCyber
carmellar4hegp@outlook.com    // by WhiteWolfCyber
amanda44i8sq@outlook.com      // by WhiteWolfCyber
gabrielai59bjg@outlook.com
christagcimrl@outlook.com
amparoy982wa@outlook.com
rachael052bx@outlook.com
sybilm0gdwc@outlook.com
christian.malcharzik@gmail.com

Email forms and attachment:

The subject in this case are formed like that (for targed "targed.emailName@targedDomain.com"):
targed.emailName

The body:
Hello targed.emailName,

You will be billed $ 2,273.42 on your Visa card momentarily.
Go through attachment to avoid it.
Password is 6089

With appreciation!
Prince

Attached file name:
Scan_targed.emailName.doc

Analysis:

Targeted extensions by @GasGeverij

.3ds.7z.accdb.ai.asp.aspx.avhd.back.bak.c.cfg.conf.cpp.cs.ctl.dbf.disk.djvu.doc.docx.dwg.eml.fdb.gz.h.hdd.kdbx.mail.mdb.msg.nrg.ora.ost.ova.ovf.pdf.php.pmf.ppt.pptx.pst.pvi.py.pyc.rar.rtf.sln.sql.tar.vbox.vbs.vcb.vdi.vfd.vmc.vmdk.vmsd.vmx.vsdx.vsv.work.xls.xlsx.xvd.zip.

IOCs

securelist.com

0df7179693755b810403a972f4466afb
42b2ff216d14c2c8387c8eabfb1ab7d0
71b6a493388e7d0b40c83ce903bc6b04
e285b6ce047015943e685e6638bd837e
e595c02185d8e12be347915865270cca

blogs.technet.microsoft.com

34f917aaba5684fbe56d3c57d48ef2a1aa7cf06d
9717cfdc2d023812dbc84a941674eb23a2a8ef06
38e2855e11e353cedf9a8a4f2f2747f1c5c07fcf
56c03d8e43f50568741704aee482704a4f5005ad

talosintelligence.com

027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745
eae9771e2eeb7ea3c6059485da39e77b8c0c369232f01334954fbac1c186c998

Droppers sent via email by WhiteWolfCyber:

9B853B8FE232B8DED38355513CFD4F30
CBB9927813FA027AC12D7388720D4771
22053C34DCD54A5E3C2C9344AB47349A702B8CFDB5796F876AEE1B075A670926
1FE78C7159DBCB3F59FF8D410BD9191868DEA1B01EE3ECCD82BCC34A416895B5
EEF090314FBEC77B20E2470A8318FC288B2DE19A23D069FE049F0D519D901B95

Codexgigas team:

a809a63bc5e31670ff117d838522dec433f74bee
bec678164cedea578a7aff4589018fa41551c27f
d5bf3f100e7dbcc434d7c58ebf64052329a60fc2
aba7aa41057c8a6b184ba5776c20f7e8fc97c657
0ff07caedad54c9b65e5873ac2d81b3126754aac
51eafbb626103765d3aedfd098b94d0e77de1196
078de2dc59ce59f503c63bd61f1ef8353dc7cf5f
7ca37b86f4acc702f108449c391dd2485b5ca18c
2bc182f04b935c7e358ed9c9e6df09ae6af47168
1b83c00143a1bb2bf16b46c01f36d53fb66f82b5
82920a2ad0138a2a8efc744ae5849c6dde6b435d

msuice

41f75e5f527a3307b246cadf344d2e07f50508cf75c9c2ef8dc3bae763d18ccf

SNORT rules for the detection by Positive Technologies (ptsecurity.com):

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg: "[PT Open] Unimplemented Trans2 Sub-Command code. Possible ETERNALBLUE (WannaCry, Petya) tool"; flow: to_server, established; content: "|FF|SMB2|00 00 00 00|"; depth: 9; offset: 4; byte_test: 2, >, 0x0008, 52, relative, little; pcre: "/\xFFSMB2\x00\x00\x00\x00.{52}(?:\x04|\x09|\x0A|\x0B|\x0C|\x0E|\x11)\x00/"; flowbits: set, SMB.Trans2.SubCommand.Unimplemented; reference: url, msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441654.aspx; classtype: attempted-admin; sid: 10001254; rev: 2;)

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg: "[PT Open] ETERNALBLUE (WannaCry, Petya) SMB MS Windows RCE"; flow: to_server, established; content: "|FF|SMB3|00 00 00 00|"; depth: 9; offset: 4; flowbits: isset, SMB.Trans2.SubCommand.Unimplemented.Code0E; threshold: type limit, track by_src, seconds 60, count 1; reference: cve, 2017-0144; classtype: attempted-admin; sid: 10001255; rev: 3;)

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg: "[PT Open] Trans2 Sub-Command 0x0E. Likely ETERNALBLUE (WannaCry, Petya) tool"; flow: to_server, established; content: "|FF|SMB2|00 00 00 00|"; depth: 9; offset: 4; content: "|0E 00|"; distance: 52; within: 2; flowbits: set, SMB.Trans2.SubCommand.Unimplemented.Code0E; reference: url, msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441654.aspx; classtype: attempted-admin; sid: 10001256; rev: 2;)

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg: "[PT Open] Petya ransomware perfc.dat component"; flow: to_server, established, no_stream; content: "|fe 53 4d 42|"; offset: 4; depth: 4; content: "|05 00|"; offset: 16; depth: 2; byte_jump: 2, 112, little, from_beginning, post_offset 4; content: "|70 00 65 00 72 00 66 00 63 00 2e 00 64 00 61 00 74 00|"; distance:0; classtype:suspicious-filename-detect; sid: 10001443; rev: 1;)

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"[PT Open] SMB2 Create PSEXESVC.EXE"; flow:to_server, established, no_stream; content: "|fe 53 4d 42|"; offset: 4; depth: 4; content: "|05 00|"; offset: 16; depth: 2; byte_jump: 2, 112, little, from_beginning, post_offset 4; content:"|50 00 53 00 45 00 58 00 45 00 53 00 56 00 43 00 2e 00 45 00 58 00 45|"; distance:0; classtype:suspicious-filename-detect; sid: 10001444; rev:1;)

Sagan log analysis rules for the detection by Quadrant Information Security (quadrantsec.com) – Note: These are NOT Snort/Suricata rules! See http://sagan.io for more details:

alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-MALWARE] Petya payload delivery SHA256 hash detected - Open source"; meta_content: "%sagan%",64b0b58a2c030c77fdb2b537b2fcc4af432bc55ffb36599a31d418c7c69e94b1,027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745,027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745,64b0b58a2c030c77fdb2b537b2fcc4af432bc55ffb36599a31d418c7c69e94b1,027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745,fe2e5d0543b4c8769e401ec216d78a5a3547dfd426fd47e097df04a5f7d6d206,ee29b9c01318a1e23836b949942db14d4811246fdae2f41df9f0dcd922c63bc6,17dacedb6f0379a65160d73c0ae3aa1f03465ae75cb6ae754c7dcb3017af1fbd,17dacedb6f0379a65160d73c0ae3aa1f03465ae75cb6ae754c7dcb3017af1fbd,e5c643f1d8ecc0fd739d0bbe4a1c6c7de2601d86ab0fff74fd89c40908654be5; meta_nocase; classtype: trojan-activity; reference: url,gist.github.com/vulnersCom/65fe44d27d29d7a5de4c176baba45759; reference: url,isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Widescale+Petya+variant+ransomware+attack+noted/22560/; sid:5003121; rev:1;)

alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-MALWARE] Petya payload delivery SHA1 hash detected - Open source"; meta_content: "%sagan%",34f917aaba5684fbe56d3c57d48ef2a1aa7cf06d,027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745,101cc1cb56c407d5b9149f2c3b8523350d23ba84,a809a63bc5e31670ff117d838522dec433f74bee,d5bf3f100e7dbcc434d7c58ebf64052329a60fc2,aba7aa41057c8a6b184ba5776c20f7e8fc97c657,bec678164cedea578a7aff4589018fa41551c27f,078de2dc59ce59f503c63bd61f1ef8353dc7cf5f,0ff07caedad54c9b65e5873ac2d81b3126754aac,51eafbb626103765d3aedfd098b94d0e77de1196,82920a2ad0138a2a8efc744ae5849c6dde6b435d,1b83c00143a1bb2bf16b46c01f36d53fb66f82b5,7ca37b86f4acc702f108449c391dd2485b5ca18c,2bc182f04b935c7e358ed9c9e6df09ae6af47168,9288fb8e96d419586fc8c595dd95353d48e8a060,736752744122a0b5e
e4b95ddad634dd225dc0f73,9288fb8e96d419586fc8c595dd95353d48e8a060,dd52fcc042a44a2af9e43c15a8e520b54128
cdc8; meta_nocase; classtype: trojan-activity; reference: url,gist.github.com/vulnersCom/65fe44d27d29d7a5de4c176baba45759; reference: url,isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Widescale+Petya+variant+ransomware+attack+noted/22560/; sid:5003122; rev:1;)

alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-MALWARE] Petya payload delivery MD5 hash detected - Open source"; meta_content: "%sagan%",71b6a493388e7d0b40c83ce903bc6b04,415fe69bf32634ca98fa07633f4118e1,0487382a4daf8eb9660f1c67e30f8b25,a1d5895f85751dfe67d19cccb51b051a; meta_nocase; classtype: trojan-activity; reference: url,gist.github.com/vulnersCom/65fe44d27d29d7a5de4c176baba45759; reference: url,isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Widescale+Petya+variant+ransomware+attack+noted/22560/; sid:5003123; rev:1;)

alert any $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: "[WINDOWS-MALWARE] Petya detected by filename - Open source"; meta_content: "%sagan%",myguy.xls,myguy.exe,BCA9D6.EXE,Order-20062017.doc,myguy.xls.hta; meta_nocase; classtype: trojan-activity; reference: url,gist.github.com/vulnersCom/65fe44d27d29d7a5de4c176baba45759; reference: url,isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Widescale+Petya+variant+ransomware+attack+noted/22560/; sid:5003124; rev:1;)

Fix suggest by @MrAdz350

If you can boot to a Windows ISO prior to Frist reboot you can use bootrec tool to prevent MBR overwriting as per https://neosmart.net/wiki/fix-mbr

Information about MBRFilter

view raw
Petya_ransomware.md
hosted with ❤ by GitHub

Just correlating all the useful information I can find with regards to the latest Petya Ransomware attack.

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100

Behaviour

<Ignored Process>
 rundll32.exe C:\027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745.bin.dll",#1" (PID: 2880)
 cmd.exe " /TR "%WINDIR%\system32\shutdown.exe /r /f" /ST 07:45" (PID: 2724) 
 schtasks.exe " /TR "%WINDIR%\system32\shutdown.exe /r /f" /ST 07:45" (PID: 2720) 
 FE04.tmp %TEMP%\FE04.tmp" \\.\pipe\{E532AB34-D5C5-4AA8-9511-A05572AE75BC}" (PID: 1968) 
 dllhost.dat %WINDIR%\027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745.bin.dll",#1 10 "%OSUSER%-PC\%OSUSER%:123456"" (PID: 2512) 1/59 Seen in another context
 cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl Setup & wevtutil cl System & wevtutil cl Security & wevtutil cl Application & fsutil usn deletejournal /D C: (PID: 2072) 
 wevtutil.exe wevtutil cl Setup (PID: 2204) 
 wevtutil.exe wevtutil cl System (PID: 2128) 
 wevtutil.exe wevtutil cl Security (PID: 4016) 
 wevtutil.exe wevtutil cl Application (PID: 3988) 
 fsutil.exe fsutil usn deletejournal /D C: (PID: 1368) 
 shutdown.exe %WINDIR%\system32\shutdown.exe" /r /f" (PID: 2796)

Petya ransomware successful in spreading because it combines both a client-side attack (CVE-2017-0199) and a network based threat (MS17-010)

https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-0199

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx

The fast-spreading Petrwrap/Petya ransomware sample we have was compiled on June 18, 2017 according to its PE timestamp. pic.twitter.com/CHUYvsiQ08

— Costin Raiu (@craiu) 27 June 2017

New Petrwrap/Petya ransomware has a fake Microsoft digital signature appended. Copied from Sysinternals Utils. pic.twitter.com/HFwA1cyoyN

— Costin Raiu (@craiu) 27 June 2017

https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/petya-ransomware-outbreak-here-s-what-you-need-know

Another good analysis from Kaspersky

How does the ransomware spread?

To capture credentials for spreading, the ransomware uses custom tools, a la Mimikatz. These extract credentials from the lsass.exe process. After extraction, credentials are passed to PsExec tools or WMIC for distribution inside a network.

Other observed infection vectors include:

A modified EternalBlue exploit, also used by WannaCry.

The EternalRomance exploit – a remote code execution exploit targeting Windows XP to Windows 2008 systems over TCP port 445 (Note: patched with MS17-010).

An attack against the update mechanism of a third-party Ukrainian software product called MeDoc.

IMPORTANT: A single infected system on the network possessing administrative credentials is capable of spreading this infection to all the other computers through WMI or PSEXEC.

Schroedinger’s Pet(ya)

Cloaking Itself in Legitimate Code

Petya uses memory injection as an evasive technique to bypass existing defenses. Attackers often use this method to hide in legitimate processes on the endpoint by injecting malicious code into the memory of non-malicious applications. Sometimes referred to as fileless malware, these threats avoid being detected by file-based detection tools, as the malicious code manipulates the memory stack to achieve malicious actions without actually placing the malicious program on the file system.

In the case of Petya, the executable creates another instance of itself and injects decrypted code into it.

https://minerva-labs.com/post/new-petya-ransomware-attack-prevented-by-minerva

Further Information